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F or the last several decadesManipur has been driven by
conflicts on issues of exclusivity,
governance and integration. The conflicts
have resulted in a series of flashpoints that
have gained national, if not global
attention. Irom Sharmila Devi, began her
indefinite fast demanding the repeal of the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958
in 2000 and has been kept alive by forced
feeding. The alleged rape and murder of
another lady, Thangjam Manorama Devi,
by the armed forces sparked agitations,
including a nude demonstration by a
dozen women in the heart of Imphal city
in 2004. The ceasefire agreement between
a prominent Naga armed group and the
Government of India brought immense
apprehension among the Manipuris
fearing the possible break-up of the state.
Overlapping claims over land and territory
by tribal groups led to violent Kuki-Naga
conflict and Kuki-Paite conflict in the
1990s. Then there was a Meitei-Meitei-
Muslim riot in 1993. Since 2000, a
prominent armed group has banned the
screening of Hindi films in Manipur
claiming that these films are a form of
‘cultural imperialism’. In 2005, an
influential Meitei socio-cultural body
spearheaded an agitation demanding the
replacement of the Bengali script by the
Meitei Mayek (script) in written
Manipuri. A year later an influential tribal
student body spearheaded an agitation
demanding the affiliation of private
schools from four hill districts of Manipur
to the Nagaland Board of Secondary
Education (NBSE). And Manipur
witnessed its first ever attack against a
place of worship, when gunmen bombed
the ISKCON temple complex in the
capital Imphal in August 2006.
THE ISSUES
Underlying this apparently
continuous upheaval are four major
issues.
The Author is an Assistant Professor in the Conflict Resolution Programme at National Institute of Advanced Studies,
Bangalore.
The paper has benefited from the comments by Mr. Hormis Tharakan and Dr. Salam Noren Singh. Ms. Asha K G also
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1. Merger with the Indian Union:
The circumstances leading to the
merger of Manipur with the Indian Union
remain an intensely debated issue in the
state. The grievances against the merger
along with the delay in conferring
statehood alienated the Manipuris, and
laid the foundation for the emergence of
a separatist movement. Down the line,
the state is today home to a large number
of non-state armed groups, and is one of
the most violence-affected states in the
country. Their aims and objectives vary
from demands for various forms of
autonomy to separation from the Indian
Union. If most of the valley-based groups
seek to restore Manipur’s pre-merger
status, the hill-based groups want either
to carve out an exclusive homeland or
integrate parts of Manipur into the
neighbouring state of Nagaland. Other
groups want to safeguard the interests of
the community which they claim to
represent.
2. Naga claims on Manipur territory:
The ongoing ceasefire between the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the
Government of India generated immense
apprehension among the Manipuris
fearing the possible break-up of the state.
The NSCN-IM’s self-defined ‘Nagalim’
includes a major portion of Manipur.
Manipur’s anxiety reached a peak when
the jurisdiction of the ceasefire was
extended beyond Nagaland in 2001.
Suddenly, there were agitations across the
state, barring the Naga-inhabited areas.
The situation took a violent turn on June
18, 2001 when thousands of people took
to the streets in Imphal, leading to the
death of 18 agitators. In view of the
unprovoked violence, the government
ordered limiting the jurisdiction of the
ceasefire within Nagaland.
3. Divisions within Manipur:
What is today peculiar to Manipur is
that the political aspirations of its ethnic
groups do not converge, and are confined
to their respective groups. These divergent
political aspirations have created fault-
lines along ethnic lines. As a result, both
the society and the polity have been deeply
polarised along ethnic lines. Even as the
Nagas have been desperately pushing for
the formation of ‘Nagalim’, the Kukis
have been demanding a separate
homeland of their own. The absence of a
clear-cut territorial boundary adds to the
points of conflict. Claims over territory by
rival armed groups have resulted in
fratricidal clashes, which have then spread
into the communities at large. The major
ethnic conflict which has greatly changed
social equations in Manipur has been the
one between the Nagas and the Kukis.
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Besides this, the significant conflicts are
those between the Paites and the Kukis;
and the Meiteis and the Meitei-Muslims.
4. The Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act, 1958:
Manipur was declared a ‘disturbed
area’ in 1980 and the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958 was imposed.
There are allegations of the special powers
under the Act being misused by the
members of the armed forces. The
implementation of this Act has resulted
unprecedented people’s uprisings. Several
civil society organizations have been
demanding the repeal of the Act. The
Government of India set up a five-member
committee in 2004 under the
Chairmanship of Justice BP Jeevan
Reddy, former Judge of the Supreme Court
of India. The committee submitted its
report in 2005, and it sought to balance
the views of the armed forces and different
sections of the people. The report
recommended repeal of the Act, while
strengthening the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act that applies to the rest
of the country.
CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONS
The sustained conflict across Manipur
has generated institutions of its own. Each
of the armed groups has its own state
apparatus. They levy taxes, define rules
and have the means to enforce them. They
sometimes claim to run their own
governments with their own ministers
and other functionaries. These groups fall
broadly into four categories: the Nagas,
the Meiteis, the Kukis and the Meitei
Muslims. The major groups are
Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF),
United National Liberation Front
(UNLF), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
(KYKL) and NSCN-IM.
The instinctive unwillingness in
political circles to come to terms with the
existence of these institutions has led to a
tendency to treat the crisis in Manipur as
essentially one of the non-implementation
of rules. In other words, the crisis has often
been treated as a law and order problem.
Consequently, when the situation began
to deteriorate Manipur was declared a
‘disturbed area’ and the Armed Forces
(Special Power) Act, 1958 was imposed.
Unfortunately, this only increased the
dissatisfaction on the ground. The situation
was further compounded by the inability
of successive state governments to meet
the growing aspirations of its people. This
dissatisfaction with the state government
too gained an ethnic dimension since the
tribal groups were generally critical of the
state government which was largely
dominated by the Meiteis.
Armed conflict in Manipur has thus
been increasingly polarised along ethnic
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and tribal lines. And the diversity of
interests on the ground has thrown up a
large number of groups. But these groups
are not without some commonalities. All
of them have devised a number of means
to generate revenues primarily from
within their areas of operations. However,
the cumulative impact has been a
breakdown in law and order and the
administrative machinery.
OPTIONS
The response to the crisis in Manipur
has tended to be centred round the
exercise of two options: the use of force,
and the promise of development. The
tendency to view the armed conflict in the
state as a ‘law and order’ problem has
contributed to a willingness to use
substantial force. And a large amount of
development funds have been earmarked
exclusively for Manipur with the principal
motive of buying peace and development.
Unfortunately, both these policy
responses have been, at best, only partially
successful in coping with the problem in
the state. Indeed, we cannot rule out the
possibility of these measures even
contributing to an accentuation of the
crisis. The use of force has generated a
significant backlash from the population
and development funds have shown a
propensity to end up in the coffers of
militant groups.
There are however other options that
have not received the attention they
deserve. First, Manipur has vocal civil
society groups which work on the issue
of human rights and cleansing of other
social ills. These groups could be nurtured
in a way that will help them bridge the
existing divide between the state and
non-state armed groups. The Meira Paibis
(the Women Torch Bearer), the Kuki Inpi
(an apex Kuki organisation), and the
Naga Mothers Association (an apex body
of the Naga women) are some such
groups. Such efforts have yielded
encouraging results in Nagaland where
the feuding NSCN factions came forward
for talks to resolve their grievances.
Second, the effectiveness of civil society
groups will depend on the creation of a
climate that suggests that the militants
will be welcome to return to peaceful ways.
This could be done by providing
temporary ‘safe passage’ to all the
members of the armed groups on the
occasion of major festivals so as to enable
them to freely visit their families and
relatives. Third, the state must devise a
meaningful surrender-cum-rehabilitation
policy for the insurgents. The absence of
such a policy has contributed to the fact
that there have been very few militants
surrendering over the years.
Another, fourth, option which requires
more careful attention is non-territorial
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autonomy. One way to satisfy the
aspirations of various ethnic groups while
preserving the territory of Manipur could
be by way of establishing regimes of non-
territorial autonomy. This type of
autonomy might be granted to all
members of a minority, irrespective of
their belonging to a certain territorial
administrative unit. It might include a
representative legislative body and an
executive component. The scope of such
autonomy might include religion, culture,
language and other welfare matters. For
instance, a tribal group might be given
the option of establishing non-territorially
defined autonomous bodies in order to
perform their religious, cultural, linguistic,
and other welfare functions. This model
of autonomy assumes increased
importance in view of the difficulties in
accepting the Naga demand for the
integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in
North-East India into one administrative
unit.





F or the last several decades,Manipur, a small state in
North-East India, has been driven by
conflicts between the state and the non-
state armed groups on the one hand, and
among its ethnic groups on the other, on
the issues of exclusivity, governance and
integration. Bandhs, road blockades and
protest rallies are common features
alongside a large quantity of small
firearms in circulation in the state. As
many as 5121 people have lost their lives
in conflict-related incidents in the state
between 1992 and 2008 (South Asia
Terrorism Portal, New Delhi). The
conflicts have resulted in a series of
flashpoints that have gained national, if
not global attention.
Fast-unto-death by Irom Sharmila
Devi
Irom Sharmila Devi began her fast-
unto-death on November 2, 2000
following the killing of ten civilians by
the members of the armed forces at Malom
near Imphal airport. The killing followed
an attack by a non-state armed group on
an Assam Rifles column in the area. Since
then, she has been demanding the repeal
of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,
1958. She is kept alive by forced feeding.
Nude protest
The alleged rape and murder of
Thangjam Manorama Devi, suspected to
be an activist of an armed group, by the
members of the armed forces sparked
large-scale agitations across Manipur.
Manorama was taken into Assam Rifles
custody, and her bullet-ridden body was
found near her home in Imphal the next
day. On July 11, 2004, a dozen women
demonstrated naked in front of the
Kangla Fort in Imphal housing the Assam
Rifles to protest the custodial death of
Thangjam Manorama Devi. They shouted
‘Indian Army, rape us too’.
NSCN-IM and Government of India
ceasefire
In 1997, the NSCN-IM and the
Government of India entered into a
CONFLICTS IN MANIPUR
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ceasefire agreement. Since the NSCN-IM
claims a part of the territory of Manipur,
the agreement saw immense apprehension
among Manipuris of a possible break-up
of their state. Manipur’s anxiety reached
its peak when the jurisdiction of the
ceasefire was extended beyond Nagaland
on June 14, 2001. There were agitations
all over Manipur, barring the Naga-
inhabited areas. The situation took a
violent turn on June 18, 2001 when
thousands of people took to the streets in
Imphal, and set ablaze the building
housing the Manipur Legislative
Assembly. Security-men opened fire to
control an irate mob leading to the death
of 18 agitators. The government then
limited the jurisdiction of the ceasefire
within the boundary of Nagaland. This
in turn annoyed the NSCN-IM who
threatened to walk out of the ceasefire
agreement.
Kuki-Naga conflict
This was the first inter-community
conflict in Manipur. Both the tribes have
been struggling for exclusive homelands.
Hence, the overlapping claims over land
and territory led to the violent Kuki-Naga
conflict which began in 1992 and
continued till 1998. It was engineered by
rival armed groups belonging to the two
tribes. It was one of the major conflicts
based on tribal lines which have greatly
changed the social equations of the state.
It has resulted in the loss of hundreds of
lives and damage to private and public
properties. Several thousands have been
either temporarily or permanently
displaced. It has led to the emergence of
a number of armed groups with Kuki
armed groups being established to counter
the Nagas.
Other conflicts and riots
A riot broke out between the Meiteis
and the Meitei-Muslims in 1993 in which
several people belonging to both sides
were killed. There were conflicts between
the Kuki and the Paite in 1997 and 1998.
Ban on Hindi films
Since 2000, the RPF banned the
screening of Hindi films in Manipur, along
with the distribution of all Hindi satellite
channels. The Hindi film, according to them,
is a form of cultural imperialism, thereby
undermining the culture of Manipur.
Campaign for Meitei Mayek (script)
In 2005, the Meetei Erol Eyek
Loinshillon Apunba Lup (MEELAL), a
Meitei socio-cultural organisation,
spearheaded an agitation demanding the
replacement of the Bengali script by the
Meitei script in written Manipuri, and to
have all school textbooks written in this
script. In the protest, the 47 year-old
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Manipur State Central Library, housing
several books and historical records was
set ablaze on April 13, 2005. These
demands are opposed by the tribals, who
favour the use of the Roman script
instead of the Meitei script.
Campaign for school affiliation to
Nagaland
In 2006, the All Naga Students’
Association Manipur (ANSAM), an
influential Naga student body, led an
agitation demanding the affiliation of
private schools from four hill districts
of Manipur (Tamenglong, Ukhrul,
Chandel and Senapati) to the Nagaland
Board of Secondary Education (NBSE).
Following this agitation, in 2007, the
Nagaland Assembly passed a Bill,
allowing affiliation of out-of-state
schools with the NBSE. To counter that,
the Government of Manipur had
brought an ordinance banning any
educational institutions or schools
within the state from affiliating with any
board of secondary education outside the
state without the prior permission of the
state government.
First bomb attack on a place of
worship
On August 16, 2006, unidentified
gunmen bombed the crowded Krishna
Janmashtami celebration (a festival that
marks the birth of Lord Krishna) being
held at the ISKCON temple complex in
the capital Imphal, killing six civilians,
including two children, while over 50
others, including five Americans and two
French nationals, were wounded. This was
the first major attack on places of worship
in the history of armed conflict in the
state. No one claimed responsibility for
the attack.
Operation Somtal II
The operation was launched in
2007 against the UNLF to clear nearly
1,000 km2 of Somtal located along the
Indo-Myanmar border in Manipur’s
Chandel district. Similar operations
in the past had failed to clear the area of
UNLF presence. If the Army claimed
successes in ‘Somtal Operation II’, the
UNLF, on the other hand, claimed that
the operation was only ‘partially
successful’.
Imphal bomb explosion
A powerful bomb explosion in Imphal
on October 21, 2008 killed a total of 18
persons and left 35 wounded. The
Kangleipak Communist Party-Military
Council (KCP-MC) claimed responsibility
for the attack stating that the action was
against security personnel whom they
alleged took part in gambling during
Diwali festival.
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Killing of Dr. Thingnam Kishan
The Sub-Divisional Officer of Khasom
Khullen in Ukhrul District, Dr. Thingnam
Kishan, and his two subordinates were
abducted by the suspected NSCN-IM
men, and were later killed in February
2009. Incidentally, all the victims were
Meiteis. The killing sparked massive
protests across the state. The NSCN-IM
admitted the involvement of one of its
cadres in the killing. Some observers
alleged the killing was an attempt to





M anipur is one of the eightstates of what is generally
referred to as the North-East region of
India; and is located alongside Mizoram
in the south, Nagaland in the north,
Assam in the west and Myanmar in the
east. It shares a 398 kilometres long
largely ungoverned international border
with Myanmar.
The state’s present unrest must be
seen in the context of its long history of
independence. The recorded history of the
kingship of Manipur begins from around
33 A.D., which marked the coronation of
Nongda Lairen Pakhangba. After
Pakhangba, a series of kings ruled the
kingdom. Reliable evidence of the early
rulers of the kingdom was available in
different records, like the Cheithrol
Kumbaba, the royal chronicle which
covers the period from 33 AD to 1890 AD.
During this period, 74 kings ruled
Manipur which was then a small, but
independent kingdom.
The status of the kingdom remained
unchanged until the Burmese occupation
for seven years from 1819 to 1825. This
period is referred to locally as Chahi Taret
Khuntakpa (or seven year devastation).
During that period the then king
Gambhir Singh took shelter in the
Cachhar area of Assam. With the
assistance of the British, Gambhir Singh
ousted the Burmese. By then, the British
also started interfering in the internal
affairs of Manipur. This led into a full-
scale battle with the British. The last
phase of the battle was fought at
Khongjom (near Imphal) and ended on
April 23, 1891. After the battle of
Khongjom, the royal palace in Imphal was
captured. From 1892 onwards it became
a princely native state under the political
control of the British India. The first
appointed king was Sir Churachand
Singh. The British paramouncy continued
till 1947. Then, for a short while, the
Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947
established a government with the
Maharaja of Manipur as the Executive
Head and an elected legislature. The first
Manipur State Assembly was opened on
October 18, 1948. Shortly after, in 1949,
Manipur was formally merged within the
Indian Union through a merger
agreement signed between the then king,
Bodhachandra Singh, and the
Government of India.
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It was then placed as a part ‘C’ state
which was administered by the President
of India through a Chief Commissioner.
In 1956, Manipur became a union
territory. Manipur became a full-fledged
state of India in 1972 with a Legislative
Assembly consisting of 60 elected
members. The first popular ministry after
attaining statehood was constituted on
March 20, 1972. The state is represented
in the lower house of the Indian
parliament (Lok Sabha) by two members;
and by one member in the upper house
(Rajya Sabha).
With an area of 22,327 km2, Manipur
lies between 23.83º and 25.68º north
latitude and 93.03º and 94.78º east
longitude. The state has nine
administrative units (districts) –
Bishnupur, Chandel, Churachandpur,
Imphal East, Imphal West, Senapati,
Tamenglong, Thoubal and Ukhrul. The
state has two distinct geographical zones:
the hill and the valley. The valley is located
at the centre surrounded by hills on all
sides. The hills account for 90 per cent
(or 20,126 km2) of the state’s area. The
valley, which accounts for two-thirds of
Manipur’s population, is a thickly
populated area with a density of 631
persons per km2. The hill region
comprising five districts (Senapati,
Tamenglong, Churachandpur, Chandel
and Ukhrul) is thinly populated with a
density of only 44 persons per km2. As
per 2001 census, the average density of
Manipur is 103 persons per km2 as
against the all India average of 313
persons per km2.
Manipur is one of the most
economically backward states in the
country due to severe shortfalls in capital,
skilled labour and infrastructure,
including power, transport and
communication. Within this
backwardness there are wide regional
disparities in terms of infrastructural
facilities. The valley is comparatively more
developed than the hill areas.
Industrialisation is almost non-existent
in both the valley and the hills.
The state has very poor road
connectivity. It is connected by road to
the rest of the country and Myanmar by
three National Highways (NH-39, NH-
53 and NH-150), totalling about 1000
kilometres of road length throughout the
state. Of the highways, the Mao-Imphal
section (109 km.) of NH-39 is the state’s
main lifeline; its major link route to the
outside world. Hundreds of vehicles ply
along this route daily to bring petrol,
diesel, cooking gas and other essential
items, including foodgrains, from other
parts of the country. In addition, large
numbers of passenger buses and private
vehicles ply along NH-39. Further, the
Imphal-Moreh section (110 km.) of
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NH-39 is also widely used by the trading
community to shop at key town of Moreh
on the Indo-Myanmar border. The other
two highways provide links to Assam,
Nagaland and Mizoram. NH-53 connects
Imphal to Silchar in Assam (223 km.)
and NH-150 connects Imphal to Kohima
in Nagaland and Aizawl in Mizoram (523
km.). The state has no navigable
waterways and virtually no railways.
Manipur’s transport system is
synonymous with roads. The only major
functional railhead linking Manipur with
the rest of the country is at Dimapur town
of Nagaland which is 215 kilometres
away from Imphal. A railhead has been
extended from Silchar to Jiribam. It covers
only 1.5 kilometres of railway line over
the state of Manipur.
The people of Manipur are
predominantly Mongoloid, and speak
Tibeto-Burman languages. They can be
classified as hill tribes and non-tribals.
The hill tribes can be further broken up
into the Naga group of tribes, the Kukis-
Chin-Mizo group of tribes, and the
intermediary group of tribes. Currently,
there are 29 officially recognized tribes
(Scheduled Tribes) in the state. They are:
Aimol, Anal, Angami, Chiru, Chothe,
Gangte, Hmar, Kabui, Kacha Naga,
Koirao/Thangal, Koireng, Kom, Lamkang,
Lushai (Mizo), Maram, Maring, Mao,
Monsang, Moyon, Paite, Purum, Ralte,
Table 1: Area and Population of Manipur by Districts (2001 census)
                Area                           Population Population
   Region/District Densi ty
Km2 % age of ‘000 Nos. % age of (per km2)
total  total
1 . Hill 20 ,089 90 .0 8 8 3 38 .5 4 4
Senapati 3,271 14.7 285 12.4 87
Tamenglong 4,391 19.7 111 4.9 25
Churachandpur 4,570 20.5 228 9.9 50
Chandel 33,13 14.8 118 5.1 36
Ukhrul 4,544 20.3 141 6.2 31
2 . Valley 2 ,238 10 .0 1 ,411 61 .5 6 3 0
Imphal East 709 3.2 395 17.2 557
Imphal West 519 2.3 444 19.4 855
Bishnupur 496 2.2 208 9.1 419
Thoubal 514 2.3 364 15.8 708
3 . Man ipur 22 ,327 100.0 2 ,294 100.0 1 0 3
Source: Economic Survey, Manipur, 2008-2009, Government of Manipur
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Salte, Sema, Simte, Tangkhul, Thadou,
Vaiphei and Zou.
In 2001, Manipur had a population
of 22,93,896, of which 61.5 per cent lived
in the valley and the remaining 38.5 per
cent in the hills. Most of the non-tribals
live in the valley; and tribals in the hills.
Non-tribal communities are barred from
buying land in the hills. According to the
2001 census, the Scheduled Tribes
population was 7.41 lakhs. 92 per cent
of the Scheduled Tribes population live
in the hill districts while the remaining
8 per cent in the valley districts. The
non-tribal communities are the Meiteis,
Meitei-Muslims and other immigrant
communities.
Manipur has a rich culture with
vibrant dances and music. The people
follow various faiths and religions, of
which Sanamahi, Hinduism, Christianity
and Islam are the most prominent.
Christianity is the major religion in the
hills; and Sanamahi and Hinduism in the
valley. The Hindus who constitute about
46 per cent of the total population mostly
live in the valley. The Meitei-Muslims who
constitute about 8 per cent of the total
population also live in the valley. Other
small communities like Sikhs, Buddhists,
Jains and others etc. constitute 10 per
cent of the state’s population.
Manipuri (or Meiteilon) is the official
language of the state. It is the principal
language spoken there. There are at least
29 different dialects spoken in the state.
Agriculture is the mainstay of
Manipur’s economy which engages
Table 2: Distribution of Population by Religion in Manipur (1971-2001)
Religious Communities                                       Population
1 9 7 1 1 9 8 1 1 9 9 1 2 0 0 1
Hindu 632597 853180 1059470 996894
Meitei-Muslim 70969 99327 133535 190939
Christ ian 279243 421702 626669 737578
S ikh 1028 992 1301 1635
Buddhis t 495 473 711 1926
Jain 1408 975 1337 1461
Others 83167 35490 14066 235280
Religion not stated 3846 8814 60 1057
Total 1 0 7 2 7 5 3 1 4 2 0 9 5 3 1 8 3 7 1 4 9 2166788 #
# Excluding Mao Maram, Paomata and Purul Sub-division of Senapati District
Source: Economic Survey, Manipur, 2008-2009, Government of Manipur
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around 75 per cent of the workers. But
the size of the cultivated area is only 9.41
per cent of the total geographical area of
the state. The valley has the most fertile
land of the state and though it accounts
for only a tenth of the total land, 52 per
cent of the cultivated area is in the valley.
Agriculture in the state is largely
dependent on rainfall. Permanent
cultivation is practised in the valley, while
in the hill areas shifting cultivation is
widely practised, with settled terrace
farming in the foothills or low slope
areas.
With hardly any major industrial
activity, the government is the major
provider of employment. The absence of
private investment has resulted in a high
rate of unemployment, particularly
among the educated youth. The handloom
industry is the largest cottage industry
in the state. It remains an important
source of income especially for the
womenfolk. A majority of the handloom
weavers are self-employed artisans who
carry out their profession in their own
homes with the assistance of their family
members in pre-loom and post-loom
processes. Food processing is also another
popular industry.
The Gross State Domestic Product
(GSDP) of Manipur for 2007-08 at
current prices was estimated to be
Rs.5704 crores. At constant (1999-00)
prices, GSDP in 2007-08 was estimated
at Rs.4464 crores. The Net State
Domestic Product (NSDP) at current
prices for the year 2007-08 was estimated
at Rs.5044 crores. The NSDP at constant
(1999-00) prices for the year 2007-08
was placed at Rs.4000 crores. Per capita
income at current prices was worked out
to be Rs.19258 in 2007-08. The per
capita income at constant (1999-00)
prices for the year 2007-08 was estimated
at Rs.15270.
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ISSUES AND CONTENDERS
T he state of armed conflict inManipur is getting more
complex than ever before due to the sharp
divergence between the different groups.
The conflict is not merely between the
state and the various non-state armed
groups, but also between these armed
groups that are polarised along ethnic
lines. In order to get a broad picture of
these conflicts it is pertinent to examine
the key issues around which much of the
conflict takes place in Manipur.
THE MERGER OF MANIPUR
The ‘Manipur Merger Agreement’ was
signed between VP Menon, the then
Adviser to the Government of India, and
Bhodachandra Singh, the then Maharaja
of Manipur, at Shillong on September 21,
1949. According to this agreement,
Manipur was formally merged within the
Indian Union on October 15, 1949. Article
I of the agreement observes:
“His Highness the Maharaja of Manipur
hereby cedes to the Dominion Government
full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and
powers for and in relation to the governance
of the State and agrees to transfer the
administration of the State to the Dominion
Government on the fifteenth day of October
1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the
said day”). As from the said day the
Dominion Government will be competent to
exercise the said powers, authority and
jurisdiction in such manner and through
such agency as it may think fit.” (see
Appendix I)
The circumstances leading to this
merger remain one of the highly debated
issues in the state even today. Several
observers have held that the then Manipur
king, Bhodachandra Singh, was forced to
sign the merger agreement; and hence
Manipur was not merged by its own will.
They also allege that the king signed the
agreement without public consent. The
merger, according to several non-state
armed groups, was ‘illegal and
unconstitutional’.
After the merger Manipur was placed
as a Part ‘C’ state which was administered
by the President of India through an
emissary. It was only in 1972 that
Manipur became a full-fledged state with
a Legislative Assembly consisting of 60
elected members. This delay further




The grievances against the merger
coupled with the delay in getting
statehood created the atmosphere for the
emergence of separatist tendencies among
a section of Manipuri society. Thereafter
several organisations with separatist
leanings emerged during 1950s. The Red
Guards founded by Hijam Irabot was
among them. After the demise of Hijam
Irabot, two other organisations, namely
Revolutionary Nationalist Party (RNP)
and Manipur Revolutionary Party (MRP)
raised the banner of autonomy. In the
meantime, UNLF, one of Manipur’s most
powerful separatist groups, was
established around 1964.
THE DEMAND FOR ‘NAGALIM’ AND
INSECURITY OF MANIPUR
The Naga armed conflict which began
in 1950s continues to have a tremendous
impact on Manipur. The NSCN-IM, a
prominent Naga armed group, has been
pressing for the formation of ‘Nagalim’
(see Map) comprising all Naga-inhabited
areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Manipur and some areas of Myanmar
which it believes to be the rightful
homeland of the Nagas. The NSCN-IM’s
self-defined ‘Nagalim’ spreads over
approximately 1,20,000 km2, which is at
least seven times bigger than the area of
the present state of Nagaland (16527
km2). The NSCN-IM maintains that
‘Nagalim’ was subdivided by the
Government of India into four different
administrative units: Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland, in
addition to a fifth part that is now in
Myanmar. The proposed map of ‘Nagalim’
includes the Karbi Anglong and NC Hills
districts of Assam. Besides, the map is
also shown to include parts of the districts
of Golaghat, Sibasagar, Dibrugarh,
Tinsukia, and Jorhat. It also includes
Dibang Valley, Lohit, Tirap and
Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh
and significant parts of four districts of
Manipur: Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul
and Chandel.
In 1997, the NSCN-IM and the
Government of India entered into a
ceasefire agreement that involved intense
negotiations to resolve the long-standing
Naga dispute. When the ceasefire was
extended ‘without territorial limits’ on
June 14, 2001 there were violent
agitations in Manipur. Since at least four
districts of Manipur (Chandel, Senapati,
Tamenglong and Ukhrul) are included in
‘Nagalim’, Manipuris believe the Nagas
are trying to destroy their state. The
Nagaland Legislative Assembly passed
resolutions on four occasions for the
integration of the Naga areas adjoining
the state of Nagaland to ‘fulfil the
aspirations of the Nagas’. On the other
side of the divide, the Manipur Legislative
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Assembly had also unanimously adopted
several resolutions to uphold the
territorial integrity of Manipur (see
Appendix II).
The situation took a violent turn on
June 18, 2001 when thousands of people
took to the streets in Imphal, and the
protesters targeted politicians of all hues
and set ablaze the building housing the
Manipur Legislative Assembly, residences
of legislators and offices of several
political parties. Eighteen protestors were
killed when the security forces opened fire
to control an irate mob. In response to
TERRITORY CLAIMED AS NAGALIM
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this violence in Manipur, the Government
of India ordered limiting the scope of the
ceasefire within the boundary of
Nagaland.
This led to a further polarisation of
the society and polity of the state. The
Manipur government declared June 18 as
‘State Integrity Day’ in honour of the 18
persons killed while protesting against the
extension of ceasefire between the
Government of India and the NSCN-IM
to Manipur. In response the ANSAM
imposed a 52-day-long (June 19 to
August 11, 2005) blockade of the Mao-
Imphal section of the NH-39. To provide
relief to the people, the Indian Air Force
was pressed into service to airlift
medicines to Manipur from Guwahati.
The divide extended into other fields
as well. When Nagas living in the hill
districts of Manipur organised an
agitation for affiliating schools there to
the Nagaland Board of Secondary
Education, the Meiteis in the valley
interpreted it as a step towards
integrating these areas into the state of
Nagaland.
DIVISIONS WITHIN MANIPUR
The issues generating conflict in
Manipur are not always related to factors
outside the state such as the demands of
Nagaland or the merger with India. There
are deep divisions within the state as well.
The divergent political aspirations of
ethnic groups in Manipur is fed by a belief
that adequate political power is a
necessary condition for retaining their
cultural identity and, more so, for all-
round development. In themselves, such
aspirations are not only reasonable but
can also be legitimate. The difficulty arises
when the aspirations for cultural identity
and development are connected to a
demand for exclusive administrative
boundaries for ‘self-governance’. Given the
nature and magnitude of ethnic diversity
of Manipur, the plurality of its population
and the shared geographical and cultural
spaces it is virtually impossible to come
up with an acceptable division of territory.
Against this backdrop the politics of
ethnic identities and exclusive divides has
not gone well for the people of Manipur
at large. None of the non-state armed
groups can claim to represent the whole
of Manipur. Contesting claims over
territorial supremacy by rival armed
groups have resulted in fratricidal clashes
that have extended from the disputed
territories to the rest of the communities
they claim to represent. One of the major
conflicts based on ethnic lines which has
greatly changed the social equation in
Manipur has been the conflict between
the Nagas and the Kukis. Other conflicts
having an impact on the overall situation
in Manipur are those between the Paites
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and the Kukis; as well as those between
the Meiteis and the Meitei-Muslims. The
Kuki-Naga clashes started in 1992,
followed by the clashes between the
Meiteis and the Meitei-Muslims in May
1993. The latest in this series was the
Kuki-Paite clashes in 1997-1998.
Kuki-Naga conflict:
In the history of conflicts between
ethnic groups in North-East India, the
Kuki-Naga conflict was the most violent,
resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives
and damage to private and public
properties. Several thousand individuals
were also either temporarily or
permanently displaced in conflicts
between the Naga group of tribes and
Kuki group of tribes. This was the first
inter-community conflict in Manipur and
one in which there was a strong
connection between identity and land.
Underlying this conflict is the fact that,
even as the Nagas have been aggressively
pushing for the formation of ‘Nagalim’,
the Kukis have been pushing for their
own homeland. The absence of a clear-cut
territorial boundary poses the biggest
hurdle to these separatist tendencies. For
instance, the Sardar Hills in Senapati
district is a crucial issue between the
Nagas and Kukis. The Nagas oppose the
Kuki’s claim for the formation of a district
here. They argue that the Kukis are later
migrants and hence not the original
inhabitants of the hills.
The overlapping claims over land and
territory led to the violent Kuki-Naga
conflict which began in 1992 and
continued till 1998. It was over the
attempt to control the border trade at
Moreh by rival armed groups that the
tussle started between the two tribes.
Following this incident, a number of Kuki
armed groups were established to counter
the Nagas.
Meitei-Meitei-Muslim conflict:
A riot broke out between the Meitei
and the Meitei-Muslims in 1993 in which
several people belonging to both sides
were killed. The exact cause of the riot is
still unknown. But, the most widely held
view is that the riot was triggered by a
tussle arising out the supply of arms by
some Muslims to an unknown armed
group. In the aftermath of that riot, a
number of Muslim armed groups were
established.
Kuki-Paite (Zomi) Conflict:
These clashes occurred in 1997 and
1998. They were an extension of the
Kuki-Naga conflict. The root cause of the
clashes was the non-acceptance of the
nomenclature ‘Kuki’ by non-Thadou
speaking groups like Zous, Simtes, Paites
and Vaipheis. It was primarily confined
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in the Churachandpur district of
Manipur.
Conflict among armed groups:
In June 2007, tensions broke out in
Moreh following the killing of a Meitei
youth by suspected Kuki separatists. The
tension was further aggravated when
unidentified men gunned down six
Meiteis and five Kukis in the same
month. Moreh is one of the popular trade
centres on the Manipur side of the India-
Myanmar border. It had a population in
the Census of India 2001 of just 16,737.
But it is a crucial centre for border trade
(both formal and informal) between
India and Myanmar, which takes place
mainly at Moreh on the Indian side and
Tamu on the Myanmar side. It is also a
major centre for illegal trade. Narcotics,
arms and other contraband come into
South Asia through this town. The Indo-
Myanmar border trade through Moreh-
Tamu sector was estimated at Rs.
9,54,79,600 in 2001-2002. This
economic success with a prominent place
for the illegal has ensured that almost
all the armed groups have long been
eying this town as it will dramatically
enhance their financial position. Life in
this border town has often been
disturbed by the turf war between rival
armed groups in their bid to control the
town and its hinterlands.
The June 2007 incidents were sparked
by a clash of interests between the UNLF
and the Kuki National Organisation
(KNO). The Kukis constitute as much
half the population of Moreh, the Meiteis
constitute just about 15 per cent and
the rest are Tamils, Punjabis, Marwaris,
Meitei-Muslims, Nagas and other smaller
tribes. The KNO while claming to
represent the Kukis wishes to bring
together all the Kuki-inhabited areas of
Manipur under one administrative unit
called ‘Zale-n-gam’ (Kuki Homeland),
whereas the UNLF wishes to establish an
independent socialist Manipur. In the
aftermath of these gruesome killings, the
two traded charges against each other.
The KNO alleged that the UNLF was
encroaching on their territory – ‘Kuki
Hills’ or ‘Zale-n-gam’. It warned UNLF
to confine itself ‘physically’ and
‘ideologically’ to the valley so as to avoid
misunderstandings between the Kukis
and Meiteis. On the other side of the
divide, the UNLF alleged that the Indian
Army had been using the KNO against
the UNLF to sow the seeds of communal
distrust and animosity. The outfit further
reiterated that it had nothing against the
Kukis but it would deal with the KNO
firmly. The NSCN-IM too joined in and
alleged that these violence incidents
exposed the devilish plans of the ‘UNLF
and the Government of Manipur’.
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The practice of education also brought
with it fresh conflicts. The demand for the
introduction of the old Meitei script in
schools across the state – supported by
an agitation in Meitei areas – was not well
received by the tribal population, which
saw it as an attempt to impose the Meitei
language and culture on them. Similarly,
when Nagas living in the hill districts of
Manipur organised an agitation for
affiliating schools there to the Nagaland
Board of Secondary Education, the
Meiteis interpreted it as a step towards
integrating these areas with the state of
Nagaland.
It is worth noting that most issues
on which bandhs and blockades are
organised are exclusive to one or the other
groups that make up Manipur’s
population. As a result Manipur is today
home to a large number of non-state
armed groups, and is one of the most
violent affected states in the country. The
Delhi-based security think-tank, South
Asia Terrorism Portal, listed as many as
40 armed separatist groups operating in
Manipur. Some of them are Revolutionary
People’s Front (RPF); United National
Liberation Front (UNLF); National
Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-
Muivah (NSCN-IM); People’s
Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
(PREPAK); Kangleipak Communist
Party (KCP); Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
(KYKL); Hmar People’s Convention-
Democracy (HPC-D); Kuki Liberation
Army (KLA); Kuki National Army
(KNA); Kuki National Front (KNF); Kuki
Revolutionary Army (KRA); People’s
United Liberation Front (PULF); United
Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF); and Zomi
Revolutionary Army (ZRA).
However, except for UNLF, RPF and
NSCN-IM, many of these groups are little
more than ragtag armed bands of one or
two leaders and their followers. Their aims
and objectives vary from demands for
various forms of autonomy to separation
from the Indian Union. If most of the
valley-based groups seek to restore
Manipur’s pre-merger status, the hill-
based groups want either to carve out an
exclusive homeland or integrate parts of
Manipur into neighbouring Nagaland.
Some groups simply want to safeguard
the interests of the community which they
claim to represent.
While these groups have diverse
interests the only issue that brings them
all together is the agitation for the
withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act, 1958.
ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS)
ACT, 1958
Manipur was declared a ‘disturbed
area’ in 1980 and the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958 (see
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Appendix III) was imposed. The Act
continues to be in place. Under this Act,
the members of the armed forces have been
given ‘some special powers’ to operate in
the ‘disturbed area’.
The Act has been a contentious one
since its very inception. There have been
allegations of the special powers under the
Act being misused by the members of the
armed forces. The implementation of this
Act has also resulted an unprecedented
people’s uprising. Several civil society
organizations have been demanding the
repeal of the Act for many years. On July
11, 2004, the alleged rape and murder of
Thangjam Manorama Devi, suspected to
be a separatist, sparked agitations across
Manipur, including the nude protest by a
dozen Manipuri women.
Proponents of the Act felt that the
situation in Manipur was ‘alarming’
considering the activities of numerous
non-state armed groups. To function in
this environment the members of the
armed forces operating in the region
required special powers. One senior
security analyst projected a grim scenario
if the Act is repealed in Manipur. He
argued that it would cause a chain
reaction in all states where the Act has
been enforced. No armed forces would like
to carry out any operation in the insurgent
affected areas without proper legal
protection for its personnel. The repeal of
the Act would demoralise the armed forces
and all initiative would be lost. Whenever
any offensive action was taken by armed
forces, the militant groups would instigate
the people/local authorities to initiate
legal cases against the armed forces.
Justice would then be biased under the
influence of militants. The militants
would get an upper hand and may be
difficult to contain. Incidents of extortion
from the civilian population/government
organisations would go unchecked. And
finally the civil administration would be
overrun by the militants and there would
be chaos all around (Anil Kamboj, 2004).
On the other hand, critics argue that
the Act had not been able to solve the
separatist problem. On the contrary, the
number of armed separatist groups has
increased manifold since the Act was
imposed in the state. The act was thus
counterproductive and only accentuated
a vicious cycle of violence.
In the wake of the intense agitation
following the death of Thangjam
Manorama Devi, and the indefinite fast
undertaken by Irom Sharmila Devi
demanding the repeal of the Act, the
Government of India set up a five-member
committee in November 2004 under the
Chairmanship of Justice BP Jeevan
Reddy, former Judge of the Supreme Court
of India. The report of that committee was
submitted to the Government of India in
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2005, and it sought to balance the views
of the armed forces and different sections
of the people. The report has not been
officially released, but was made public
by a national daily, ‘The Hindu’. The
report recommended repeal of the Act,
while strengthening the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act that applies
to the rest of the country. The committee
observed:
“The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,
1958 should be repealed. Therefore,
recommending the continuation of the
present Act, with or without amendments,
does not arise. The Act is too sketchy, too
bald and quite inadequate in several
particulars … We must also mention the
impression gathered by it during the course
of its work viz., the Act, for whatever reason,
has become a symbol of oppression, an object
of hate and an instrument of discrimination
and highhandedness. It is highly desirable
and advisable to repeal this Act altogether,
without, of course, losing sight of the
overwhelming desire of an overwhelming
majority of the region that the Army should
remain (though the Act should go). For that
purpose, an appropriate legal mechanism
has to be devised. The committee was also
of the firm view that it would be more
appropriate to recommend insertion
of appropriate provisions in the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (as amended in the year 2004) -
which is a cognate enactment as pointed
out in Chapter III Part II of this Report
instead of suggesting a new piece of
legislation” (Government of India, “Report
of the Committee to Review the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958”,
2005).
However, the recommendations of the
report have not yet been either accepted




T he picture of conflict inManipur has place for
institutions in both the senses that John
Rawls has suggested. To recall his view,
an institution could be thought of in two
ways. First, it could be seen as an abstract
object expressed by a system of rules.
Second, it could be seen as the realisation
in the thought and conduct of certain
persons at a certain time and place of the
actions specified by these rules. We could
identify institutions like the state with a
set of abstract rules and insist that its
power, including military power, must be
used to enforce these rules. On the other
hand we could see the institutions in
terms of the realisation of the thought and
conduct of the persons involved. The crisis
in Manipur can be seen as a result of the
inability to enforce a set of abstract rules
leading to the emergence of new
institutional practices on the ground.
The initial reaction to the crises in
Manipur has been to treat it as a case of
non-implementation of rules, that is, as a
law and order problem. These efforts
yielded little success on the ground for at
least three reasons. First and foremost, the
separatists had easy access to the
neighbouring countries. Secondly, the
terrain is a handicap for the security
forces, but an advantage for separatists
using guerrilla tactics. Thirdly, the
separatists could easily assimilate into the
local population. This helped them tap
the discontent that emerged from
Manipur being declared a ‘disturbed area’
in 1980 and the consequent imposition
of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,
1958. The dissatisfaction on the ground
was compounded by the inability of the
successive state governments to meet the
growing aspirations of its people.
Though directed against the state, the
many agitations in Manipur also reflect
the deep divisions that exist on the
ground. The tribal groups, who mainly
inhabit the hills, are generally critical of
the state government which is largely
dominated by the Meitei community that
lives in the valley. The tribal groups
mainly resort to blockades of the inter-
state highways that serve as the life-line
of the valley. In contrast, in the valley,
bandhs are common. Besides affecting the
economy, bandhs and blockades also
expose the deepening divide between the
hills and the plains. This is further
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compounded by the overlapping claims
over land and territory by various
separatist groups.
In practice this widespread discontent,
and the political responses to it, have
created their own institutions. Some of
these institutions are socio-political while
others are economic. The socio-political
groups are, in keeping with the overall
trends in the state, polarised along ethnic
and tribal lines, although there were also
some attempts for a united struggle.
Separatist groups in Manipur can be
broadly divided into four groups: Meitei
separatist groups; Naga separatist groups,
Kukis-Chin-Mizo separatist groups; and
Meitei-Muslim separatist groups. The main
economic institution that has been created
by the conflict is a taxation mechanism
put in place by major separalist groups.
SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The socio-political institutions that
have emerged from the conflicts in
Manipur are specific to the different
groups in the state, though they have
some common features. It is useful to first
look at these institutions as they have
emerged in each group, before considering
their common features.
Meitei groups
The primary objective of these groups
is to restore the pre-merger status of
Manipur. Hence they are not in favour of
resolving their grievances within the
framework of the Indian constitution.
Among them UNLF, RPF and KYKL are
considered more influential. The UNLF is
one of the oldest separatist groups which
came into existence around 1964 with the
primary objective of the restoration of the
pre-merger status of Manipur. In 1978,
the RPF was established. Its founding
principle was to organise a revolutionary
front of the North-East region and the
liberation of Manipur. KYKL was
established around 1994. It focuses
primarily on what it considers cleansing
Manipuri society, and is known for its
moral policing activities.
Until 1990, the UNLF mainly
engaged in mobilisation and recruitment;
and undertook a vigorous campaign
against alcoholism, gambling, and
substance (drug) abuse. With the
formation of its armed wing, the Manipur
People’s Army (MPA) in 1990, it stepped
up guerrilla activities targeting security
forces. MPA is said to have five battalions.
The RPF too was initially focusing more
on mobilisation and recruitment; and as
the watchdog of the society. Its armed
wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
also actively engaged the security forces.
They are acquainted with the use of
AK-series rifles, M-16 rifles, self-loading
rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, grenade
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launchers, pistols, landmines, G-3 rifles,
INSAS rifles, and improvised explosive
devices. Both the groups have a dedicated
civil wing that looks after the
developmental and other welfare needs of
the people. In the propaganda to
popularise its agenda, the UNLF
observed:
“In the wake of the forcible annexation of
Manipur by the Dominion of India in 1949,
patriotic individuals grouped together to
establish the UNLF on 24 November 1964
with the objective of restoring Manipur’s
sovereign independence by waging a
national liberation struggle against India.
The social goal of UNLF is to build a socialist
society wherein all the ethnic nationalities of
Manipur shall live in harmonious coexistence
and co-development in a new, united,
sovereign and independent Manipur. The
UNLF has also a regional outlook that
believes in the basic unity of the region
inhabited by many ethnic nationalities and
that this reality compels the region to fight
together to overthrow Indian rule for a
common future of peace, progress and
development”.
UNLF and RPF are considered to be
‘disciplined groups’; and have substantial
support among the people. They are also
suspected of maintaining cordial
relationships with some civil society
groups of the state. During the early years
of their existence, they concentrated
mainly in the valley, and later expanded
in the hills. They run a number of training
camps and hideouts both within and
outside Manipur. Some of the separatist
groups have been able to carve out
‘liberated zones’ in areas where the
presence of the security forces is minimal.
They have working relationships with
several separatist groups both within and
outside Manipur. UNLF has efficient
working relations with the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K), and United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA). In 1990, the UNLF
along with NSCN-K and ULFA floated a
coalition called the Indo-Burma
Revolutionary Front (IBRF) to wage a
united armed struggle against India.
UNLF has been very vocal against the
NSCN-IM demand for the integration of
all Naga-inhibited areas of Manipur into
Nagaland. There were instances of fighting
between the two groups.
Some of the groups also claim to act
as watchdogs of society. For instance,
KYKL, another influential group, is
actively engaged in ‘cleansing’ the ills of
Manipur society by punishing officials for
their alleged involvement in corrupt
practices, school teachers for helping
students cheat in examinations and drug
traffickers peddling drugs from across the
border. They also issued diktats on other
social and cultural issues. Likewise,
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UNLF, PREPAK and KYKL have jointly
imposed a complete ban on the import,
manufacturing, sale and consumption of
all kinds of narcotic drugs and
intoxicating substances in the state. In
1990, the RPF began a campaign against
the use and the sale of liquor and drugs.
Latter, the state government declared the
state ‘dry’ from April 1, 1991. The RPF
also banned lotteries with effect from
September 3, 1991. Since 2000, the RPF
has successfully banned the screening of
Hindi films in Manipur claiming that the
Hindi film is a form of ‘cultural
imperialism’.
Naga groups
Armed conflict in the Naga Hills (now
Nagaland) of then undivided Assam
which was initiated in the 1950s also
spilled over into the Naga inhabited areas
of Manipur. Several of the members of the
Naga separatist groups were from
Chandel, Ukhrul, Senapati and
Tamenglong districts of Manipur.
Following the signing of the Shillong
Accord between the representatives of
Naga separatists and the Government of
India in 1975, peace was restored in Naga-
dominated areas of Manipur and
Nagaland. But, the peace was short-lived
as Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu
and SS Khaplang, who stood against the
Shillong Accord, established the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in
1980. Major differences of opinion among
its top leaders led to its split into two
factions in 1988. They are now known as
the NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K. The
former is an influential player in the
conflict in Manipur.
Almost all the major Naga armed
groups aspire for an exclusive Naga
homeland by integrating all the Nagas
who are scattered within the territory of
India and neighbouring Myanmar. The
primary aim of the NSCN-IM is to
establish a ‘Nagalim’. The core support
base of the NSCN-IM consists primarily
of the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur. It has
considerable influence in Senapati,
Ukhrul, Chandel and Tamenglong.
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu
are the general secretary and chairman of
the NSCN-IM and they operate
extensively from outside India. The Naga
Army is its military wing and consists of
one brigade and six batallions.
NSCN-IM has established a
government-in-exile called the
Government of the People’s Republic of
Nagaland (GPRN). It virtually runs a
parallel government in the areas it
dominates. There are four major
‘Ministries’ – defence, home, finance and
foreign. Besides, there are five other
Ministries including education,
information and publicity, forests and
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minerals, law and justice and religious
affairs. The “Home Ministry” is the most
powerful of all the ministries. The heads
of 11 administrative regions report to the
‘Home Minister’. The administration
reaches down to the town and village
levels in their areas of influence.
NSCN-IM is considered one of the
richest armed groups in North-East India.
It is alleged to be involved in narcotics
trade to buy arms and also pay for
training of its cadre. It also runs camps
for training members of other armed
groups on payment. They have established
well connected contacts for arms
procurement from several South East
Asian nations, and have very well
established links for transportation
through Bangladesh and Myanmar. The
outfit has also opened up contacts with
various international organisations like
the UN Human Rights Organisation in
Geneva, the Unrepresented Nations and
People’s Organisation (UNPO) at the
Hague and the UN Working Group on
Indigenous People (UNWGIP).
The Government of India and NSCN-
IM entered into ceasefire agreement in
1997 and have been involved in peace
talks since then. Its ceasefire with the
government has caused enormous anxiety
among the Meiteis fearing the possible
break-up of the present territorial
boundary of Manipur. At the same time,
NSCN-IM is widely considered as the
chief architect of the violent Kuki-Naga
conflict.
Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups
The erstwhile armed conflict in the
Mizo hills (now Mizoram) of the then
undivided Assam has tremendous
influence on the initiation of armed
conflict among the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group
of tribes. Many of the youth belonging to
this group were part of the armed conflict
in Mizo hills with the goal of a ‘Greater
Mizoram’. Even as the Mizo Accord gave
birth to the present state of Mizoram, these
youth felt a need to counter the
dominating attitude of the NSCN-IM in
its push for the creation of ‘Nagalim’. This
prompted them to organise their own
armed groups.
The territories claimed by both the
Nagas and the Kuki-Chin-Mizo overlap.
The situation deteriorated with the
outbreak of the violent inter-tribal conflict
that killed over 1,000 people. Ethnically
mixed villages, once common in Manipur,
have virtually disappeared. The key factor
that prompted the Kuki-Naga clashes
was the desire of the Naga armed groups
to ease out the Kukis who form a sizeable
chunk of the population in the four
hill districts of the state. This also led
to the emergence of several Kuki
armed groups that also resorted to violent
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means to counter to defend the
community. The Kuki-Naga conflict led
to a spin-off conflict between Kukis
and Paites too.
 There are about twenty armed groups
under this category, in which the KNF and
the KNA are the prominent ones. They
were established in 1988 and 1991
respectively. The KNF seeks to carve out
an autonomous Kukiland within the
framework of the Indian constitution,
whereas the KNA wants an independent
‘Zale-n-gam’ which would include all
Kuki inhabited areas of India and
Myanmar too. They operate extensively
in Churachandpur district and other
Kuki inhibited areas of the Chandel,
Tamenglong and Senapati districts. Like
other ethnic tribes the Kuki community
has also been demanding a homeland
for preserving the identity of their
community. Most of these groups want a
separate homeland within the Indian
Union.
Altogether eighteen Kuki armed groups
under the banner of the KNO and the
United People’s Front (UPF) entered into
an understanding with the government to
temporally suspend their operations and
prepare for political dialogue.
Meitei-Muslim groups
A communal riot between the Meiteis
and the Meitei-Muslims in 1993 led to
about 150 deaths of members of both
communities. Subsequently, discontented
members of the minority Muslim
community formed a number of armed
groups to safeguard the interest of their
community. The PULF, founded in 1993,
is one of them. It seeks to safeguard the
interests of the Muslim community. The
group also envisions a society based on
Islamic values and to this end, has acted
against the prevalence of substance abuse
and alcoholism among Muslims in the
state. PULF operates mainly in the valley.
Common features
Several observers have opined that
most of the armed groups of Manipur are
little more than ragtag armed bands of
one or two leaders and their followers.
However, groups like UNLF, PLA and
NSCN-IM are known to be well-organised
and well-equipped with latest weaponry
at their disposal. Their members are also
said to be well-behaved, and they use this
reputation to muster substantial mass
support. They are also said to be sensitive
to the wellbeing of the common people.
At the same time, there are narratives of
their close proximity to some influential
civil society groups.
Some of these armed groups have also
assigned to themselves a ‘watchdog’
role. They have imposed a ban on all
open debates and discussion on the
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controversies relating to Meitei script, the
sale and consumption of narcotics, and
the sale of Indian Made Foreign Liquor
(IMFL). They have also successfully
banned lotteries and the screening of
Hindi films in the state.
There exists working relationships
among some of these groups. The UNLF,
PREPAK and PLA are the constituent
units of the larger front called the Manipur
People’s Liberation Front (MPLF). Beyond
Manipur, some of them have logistic
partnerships with several other armed
groups, including that of ULFA in Assam.
At the same time, there are also intra-
group and inter-group rivalries.
Internecine clashes have often taken place
among rival armed groups. For instance,
the UNLF and the NSCN-IM are not in
good terms due to their conflicting
ideologies. If the former is firmly opposed
to the break up of Manipur, the latter is
seeking a unified Naga homeland
comprising the present state of Nagaland
and the Naga inhabited areas of
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur.
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
The cumulative impact of the activities
of the various separatist groups has been
the breakdown in law and order and the
administrative machinery of the state.
This has a direct effect on the economy.
Large portions of the state’s resources
are both directly and indirectly siphoned
out by the armed groups. As a result
the delivery mechanisms for the
developmental and relief services of the
state often fail, bringing planned
developmental activities to a standstill.
Further, the groups also directly interfere
in the award of government contracts and
execution of developmental projects. The
situation on the ground has thrown up
its own economic institutions, including
tax collection by armed groups.
Tax collection
Almost all of the armed groups of
Manipur do not have the financial
resources needed to run an armed group.
Where do the funds come from? Not all
the groups are involved in gun-running
or drug trade. Instead, they have devised
a number of means to generate revenues
primarily from within their areas of
operation. First and foremost, they
regularly levy ‘revolutionary taxes’ on the
people based on their economic status. In
the process, the officials of the state,
businessmen, and contractors are the
most sought after. Various government
departments are also accused of paying a
fixed percentage of their revenues to the
armed groups. Further, they also directly
or indirectly interfere in the award of
government contracts and execution of
developmental projects. A few of them are
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also said to be involved in narcotics trade
and gun-running. However, they denied
these charges.
The NSCN-IM is known to be the chief
benefactor of the ‘revolutionary taxes’
collected from vehicles plying along the
National Highway No. 39. Manipur is
principally connected by road to the rest
of the country and to Myanmar by three
National Highways. With no rail links,
the only other connection is few flights a
day. Of the highways, the Mao-Imphal
section of NH-39 is the state’s main
lifeline, its major link route to the outside
world. Several hundreds trucks ply along
this route daily to bring petrol, diesel,
cooking gas and other essential items,
including food grains, from other parts of
the country. In addition, large numbers
of passenger buses and private vehicles
ply along NH-39. Further, the Imphal-
Moreh section of NH-39 is also widely
used by the trading community to shop
at Moreh. Besides, NH-53 connects
Imphal to Silchar in Assam, and NH-150
connects Imphal to Kohima in Nagaland
and Aizawl in Mizoram. The extended
sections on all these highways operate on
the whims of various armed groups. The
Mao-Imphal section of NH-39 is virtually
under the control of the NSCN-IM. The
Imphal-Moreh section of the NH-39 is
similarly under the control of various
Kuki groups as well as the NSCN-IM.
They blocked these highways on several
occasions whenever the owner’s of
commercial vehicles refuse to pay the
‘revolutionary taxes’ demanded.
Insecurity on the highways is
compounded by repeated attacks on the
security forces and commercial vehicles.
As these highways pass along rough hilly
terrain, the security forces can do little to
pre-empt attacks.
In such an environment of rampant
extortion, compounded by widespread
corruption at every level of the state
administration, development activities
have languished. Basic infrastructure
facilities like roads, communications,
health care and education, all show visible
signs of decline. The situation has reached
the stage where officials of the state as
well as the common people have begun






B y and large, the armedconflict in Manipur was
viewed as a ‘law and order’ problem; and
hence the response was also a ‘law and
order’ approach. Thus, Manipur was
declared a ‘disturbed area’ and the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 was
imposed. A number of armed groups were
notified as unlawful organisations. From
time to time, a number of operations had
been directed against the armed groups.
Over the years, a large number of security
forces have been deployed in the state. It
has the highest police-people ratio in the
country, with 627 policemen for every
100,000 persons. Beyond this, however,
efforts to bring a negotiated peace in the
state have been minimal.
There have been some efforts by
successive state governments to move
towards a process of dialogue. The
erstwhile People’s Front government
headed by Radhabinod Koijam offered,
on February 28, 2001, a unilateral
month-long cease-fire, commencing
March 1, 2001, to 17 separatist outfits.
Subsequently, on March 19, 2001, the
then Governor Ved Marwah announced
the setting up of a contact group to liaison
with separatist groups. However, they
rejected the ceasefire offer and continued
to commit acts of violence.
A second response has been to
earmark a large amount of development
funds exclusively for Manipur with
the principal motive of buying peace
and development. In order to achieve
faster economic development, the
Government of India has made special
provision by declaring all states of
the North-East region as the ‘Special
Category States’. Besides, various
central ministries have been outlaying
funds through their respective budget
for the development of their respective
sectors in these states. These states
are also implementing their own
development programmes. Furthermore,
the North Eastern Council (NEC) and
the Ministry of Development of North
East Region (MDONER) exclusively
handle the developmental needs of the
region.
Unfortunately, these policy responses
have been, at best only partly successful
in coping with the problems in Manipur.
Indeed, it could even be argued that they
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are counter productive. The adverse
reaction to the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act has been so adverse that it
may have even served to accentuate the
problem. And with the rampant
corruption in the state the additional
funds allocated to it sometimes only goes
to finance militant activities.
The result of the government’
initiatives has thus been mixed. The
government has managed to arrive at
cessation of hostility accords with several
Kuki armed groups since 2005. However,
none of the major groups have shown any
intent to engage in negotiations. Indeed,
the UNLF ruled out any negotiations with
the Government of India without the
United Nations mediation. It considered
a plebiscite is the only way to go if
government wanted armed conflict in
Manipur to end. Similarly, PLA ruled out
accepting the government’s offer for peace
talks, saying that entering into a dialogue
would not ‘restore freedom’. In 2005, the
UNLF made a four-point proposal to
resolve Manipur’s armed conflict. They are:
i) to hold a plebiscite under UN
auspices to enable the people of
Manipur to exercise their democratic
right on the restoration of Manipur’s
sovereignty and independence;
ii) to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in
Manipur to ensure free and fair
conduct of the plebiscite;
iii) UNLF to deposit all its arms to the
UN peacekeeping force and India to
withdraw all its regular and
paramilitary forces from Manipur
before a deadline prior to the plebiscite
date to be decided by the UN; also,
the peacekeeping force to call upon
all other armed opposition groups in
Manipur to follow suit; and
iv) the UN to hand over political power
in accordance with the result of the
plebiscite.
The UNLF alleges that peace talks are
always one-sided and work in favour of
the government. It even appealed to
ceasefire groups to realise the danger and
return to the revolutionary path. It also
expressed willingness to work with
NSCN-IM on territorial issues of
Manipur, if the latter abandoned the path
of ‘compromise with India’ and resumed
its armed struggle. Having said that there
has not been sincere attempt on the part
of the state to bring the major armed
groups to the dialogue process, but, UNLF
proposal for plebiscite has triggered some
response among a section of the people.
In this context, the proposal should be
taken as a positive indicator to reach out
to the UNLF leadership.
NEW OPTIONS
After assessing the ground realities of
the current conflict in Manipur, we
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strongly recommend the following
measures in order to bring the major
armed separatist groups into the
mainstream:
1 Civil society initiative:
Manipur has a vocal civil society
groups which work on the issue of human
rights and cleansing of other social ills.
Beyond that it could be time to nurture
these groups in a way which will facilitate
to fill the existing divide between the
state and non-state armed groups.
The Meira Paibis (the Women Torch
Bearer), the Kuki Inpi (an apex Kuki
organisation), and the Naga Mothers
Association (an apex body of the Naga
women) are some such groups. Such
efforts have yielded encouraging results
in Nagaland where the feuding NSCN
factions came forward for talks to resolve
their grievances. Further, the services of
widely respected personalities of Manipur,
namely, Ratan Thiyam (noted theatre
personality) and M.K. Binodini (noted
writer) could also be explored as was the
case in Assam.
2 Safe passage:
The option of providing temporary
‘safe passage’ to all the members of the
armed groups on the occasion of major
festivals, namely, Ningol Chakouba,
Christmas and Kut, could be initiated so
as to enable them to freely visit their
families and relatives. This would help in
building goodwill and the sincerity of the
government.
3 Rehabilitation policy:
Manipur does not have proper
rehabilitation policy for the surrendered
insurgents. Therefore, there was hardly
any surrender taking place over the years.
The state could devise a surrender-cum-
rehabilitation policy that would help
bring at least some of the insurgents back
into the mainstream.
4 Non-territorial autonomy:
One way to satisfy the aspirations of
various ethnic groups while preserving the
territory of existing states in North-East
India could be by way of establishing
regimes of non-territorial autonomy. Such
autonomy would be best suited to
ethnically diverse North-East India, as it is
detached from territorial dimensions. This
type of autonomy might be granted to all
members of a minority, irrespective of their
belonging to a certain territorial
administrative unit. It might include a
representative legislative body and an
executive component. The scope of such
autonomy might include religion, culture,
language and other welfare matters. For
instance, a tribal group might be given the
option of establishing non-territorially
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defined autonomous bodies in order to
perform their religious, cultural, linguistic,
and other welfare functions. This model of
autonomy is suited for the Nagas and the
Kukis. This model of autonomy would
assume greater significance in view of the
need to counter territory based demands,
such as that of the Nagas for the integration
of all Naga-inhabited areas in North-East
India into one administrative unit.
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AGREEMENT MADE THIS twenty-
first day of September 1949 between the
Governor General of India and his
Highness, the Maharajah of Manipur.
WHEREAS in the best interests of
the State of Manipur as well as of the
Dominion of India it is desirable to provide
for the administration of the said State
by or under the authority of the Dominion
Government.
IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS
FOLLOWS:
Article I
His Highness the Maharajah of
Manipur hereby cedes to the Dominion
Government full and exclusive authority,
jurisdiction and powers for and in relation
to the governance of the State and agrees
to transfer the administration of the State
to the Dominion Government on the
fifteenth day of October 1949 (there in
after referred to as “the said day”). As from
the said day the Dominion Government
will be competent to exercise the said
powers, authority and jurisdiction in such




(Source: United Committee Manipur, 2003)
Article II
His Highness the Maharajah shall
continue to enjoy the same personal
rights, privileges, dignities, titles,
authority over religious observances,
customs, usages, rites and ceremonies and
institutions in charge of the same in the
State, which he would have enjoyed had
this agreement not been made.
Article III
His highness the Maharajah shall
with effect from the said day be entitled
to receive for his lifetime from the
revenue of the State annually for his
Privy Purse the sum of Rupees three
lakhs free of all taxes. This amount is
intended to cover all the expenses of the
Ruler and his family, including expenses
on account of his personal staff and
armed guards, maintenance of his
residences, marriages and other
ceremonies, etc. and the allowances to the
Ruler’s relations who on the date of
execution of this agreement were in
receipt of such allowances from the
revenues of the State, and will neither
be increased nor reduced for any reason
whatsoever. The Government of India
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undertake that the said sum of Rupees
three lakhs shall be paid to His
Highness the Maharajah in four equal
installments in advances at the
beginning of each quarter from the State
treasury or at such other treasury as may
be specified by the Government of India.
Article IV
His Highness the Maharajah shall
be entitled to the full ownership, use and
enjoyment of all private properties (as
distinct from State properties) belonging
to him on the date of this agreement.
His Highness the Maharajah will
furnish to the dominion Government
before the first January 1950, an
inventory of all the immovable property,
securities and cash balance held by him
as such private property. If any dispute
arises as to whether any item of
property is the private property of his
highness the Maharajah or State
property, it shall be referred to a Judicial
Officer qualified to be appointed as a
High Court Judge, and the decision of
that officer shall be final and binding
on both parties. Provided that his
Highness the Maharajah’s right to the
use of the residences known as
“Redlands” and “Les Chatalettes” in
Shillong, and the property in the town
of Guwahati known as “Manipuri Basti”
shall not be questioned.
Article V
All the members of His Highness’s
family shall be entitled to all the personal
rights, privileges, dignities and titles
enjoyed by them whether within or
outside the territories of the State,




guarantees the succession, according to
law and custom, to the gaddi of the State
and to his highness, the Maharajah’s
personal rights, privileges, dignities, titles,
authority over religious observances,
customs usages, rites and ceremonies and
institutions in-charge of the same in the
State.
Article VII
No enquiry shall be made by or under
the authority of the Government of India,
and no proceedings shall lie in any Court
in Manipur, against His highness the
Maharajah whether in a personal capacity
or otherwise in respect of anything done
or omitted to be done by him or under
his authority during the period of his
administration of that State.
Article VIII
The Government of India hereby
guarantees either the continuance in
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service of the permanent members of the
Public Services of Manipur on conditions
which will be not less advantageous than
those on which they were serving before
the date on which the administration of
Manipur is made over to the Government
of India or the payment of reasonable
compensation.
The Government of India further
guarantees the continuance of pensions
and leave salaries sanctioned by His
Highness the Maharajah to servants of
the State who have retired or proceeded
on leave preparatory to retirement, before
the date on which the Administration of
Manipur is made over to the Government
of India.
The Government of India shall also
undertake to make suitable provisions for
the employment of Manipuris in the
various branches of Public Services, and
in every way encourage Manipuris to join
them. They also undertake to preserve
various laws, customs and conventions
prevailing in the State pertaining to the
social, economic and religious life of the
people.
Article IX
Except with the previous sanction of
the Government of India no proceedings,
civil or criminal, shall be instituted
against any person in respect of any act
done or purporting to be done in the
execution of his duties as a servant of the
State before the day on which the
administration is made over to the
Government of India.
In confirmation whereof Mr. Vapal
Pangunni Menon, Adviser to the
Government of India in the Ministry of
States, has appended his signature on
behalf and with the authority of the
Governor General of India and His
Highness Maharajah Bodhachandra
Singh, Maharajah of Manipur has
appended his signature on behalf of








Shillong, September 21, 1949.
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Subject Matter:  Territorial Integrity
Adopted: 23.06.2005
“This august House in its sitting held
on 23rd day of June 2005 while
reaffirming its earlier resolutions adopted
on 24-3-95, 14-3-97, 17-7-98, 17-12-98,
22-3-01 and 12-6-02 respectively
relating to the protection and
maintenance of the Territorial Integrity of
Manipur further unanimously resolves to
(APPENDIX II)
Resolution Passed by Manipur Legislative Assembly
(Source: Manipur Legislative Assembly, Imphal)
urge upon the Government of India to
make suitable amendments of Article 3
of the Constitution of India or to
insert appropriate provisions in the
Constitution of India for protecting







Violence became the way of life in
north-eastern States of India. State
administration became incapable to
maintain its internal disturbance. Armed
Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special
Powers Ordinance was promulgated by
the President on 22nd May of 1958. In
which some special powers have been give
to the members of the armed forces in
disturbed areas in the State of Assam and
Union Territory of Manipur. Later the
Ordinance was replaced by the armed
Forces Special Powers Bill.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
An ordinance entitled the Armed forces
(Assam and Manipur) Special Powers
Ordinance, 1958, was promulgated by the
President on the 22nd May, 1958. Section
3 of the Ordinance powers the Governor
of Assam and the Chief Commissioner of
Manipur to declare the whole or any part
of Assam or the Union territory of Manipur,
as the case may be, to be a disturbed area.
On such a declaration being made in the
Official Gazette, any Commissioned Officer,
Warrant Officer, non-commissioned officer
or any other person of equivalent rank in
(APPENDIX III)
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958
(Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi)
the armed forces may exercise, in the
disturbed area, the powers conferred by
section 4 and 5 of the Ordinance. The Bill
seeks to replace the Ordinance –See Gazette
of India, 11-8-1958, Pt. II-Sec. 2, Ext.
p.714 (No.26).
ACT 28 OF 1958
The Armed Forces (Special Powers)
Bill was passed by both the Houses of
Parliament and it received the assent of
the President on 11th September, 1958.
It came on the Statute Book as THE
ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS)
ACT, 1958 (28 of 1958).
LIST OF AMENDING ACTS
1. The State of Mizoram Act, 1986 (34
of 1986).
2. The State of Arunachal Pradesh Act,
1986 (69 of 1986).
3. The Armed Forces (Assam and
Manipur) Special Powers
(Amendment) Act, 1972 (7 of 1972).
4. The Armed Forces Special Powers
(Extension to Union Territory of
Tripura) Act, 1970.
5. The Repealing and Amending Act,
1960 (58 of 1960). 
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The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958
(28 of 1958)
c) all other words and expressions
used herein, but not defined and
defined in the Air Force Act, 1950
(45 of 1950), or the army Act,
1950 (46 of 1950) shall have the
meanings respectively to them in
those Acts.
3. Powers to declare areas to be
disturbed areas – If, in relation to any
state or Union Territory to which this
act extends, the Governor of that State
or the administrator of that Union
Territory or the Central Government,
in either case, if of the opinion that
the whole or any part of such State of
Union territory, as the case may be, is
in such a disturbed or dangerous
condition that the use of armed forces
in aid of the civil power is necessary,
the Governor of that State or the
Administrator of that Union Territory
or the Central Government, as the case
may be , may by notification in the
Official Gazette, declare the whole or
such part of such State or Union
territory to be a disturbed area].
[11th September, 1958]
An Act to enable certain special
powers to be conferred upon members of
the armed forces in disturbed areas in the
State of *[Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland
and Tripura].
Be it enacted by Parliament in Ninth
Year of the republic of India as follows:-
1. Short title and extent – (1) This act
may be called **[The armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958].
***[(2)] It extends to the whole of the
State of ****[Arunachal Pradesh,
Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura].
2. Definitions: In this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires-
a) “armed forces’ means the military
forces and the air forces operating
as land forces, and includes other
armed forces of the Union so
operating;
b) ‘disturbed area’ means an area
which is for the time being
declared by notification under
section 3 to be a disturbed area’;
* Subs. By Act 69 of 1986,sec.43 for “Assam, Manipur, Megahalya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura and the Union
territory of Arunachal Pradesh” (w.e.f. 20.2.1987.)
** Subs by Act 7 of 1973, sec. 3 for ‘the armed forces (Assam and Manipur) special Powers Act, 1958" (w.e.f 5.4.1972).
*** Subs by Act 7 of 1972, sec. 4 (w.e.f 5.4.1972).
***** Subs by Act.69 of 1986, sec. 43 for ‘Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura and the Union
Territory of Arunachal Pradesh’ (w.e.f 20.2.1987).
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The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958
disturbed area prohibiting the
assembly of five or move persons
or the carrying of weapons or of
things capable of being used as
weapons or of fire-arms,
ammunition or explosive
substances;
b) if he is of opinion that it is
necessary so to do, destroy any
arms dump, prepared or fortified
position or shelter from which
armed attacks are made or are
likely to be made or are attempted
to be made, or any structure used
as a training camp for armed
volunteers or utilized as a hide-
out by armed gangs or absconders
wanted for any offence;
c) arrest, without warrant, any
person who has committed a
cognizable offence or against
whom a reasonable suspicion
exists that he has committed or
is about to commit a cognizable
offence and may use such force as
may be necessary to effect the
arrest;
d) enter and search without warrant
any premises to make any such
arrest as aforesaid or to recover
any person believed to be
COMMENTS
i) The Governor is empowered to declare
any area of the State as “disturbed
area’. It could not be arbitrary on
ground of absence of legislative
guidelines; Inderjit Barua v. State of
Assam, AIR 1983 Del. 514.
ii) Section 3 cannot be construed as
conferring a power to issue a
declaration without any time limit.
There should be periodic review of the
declaration before the expiry of six
months; Naga People’s Movement of
Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR
1998 SC 431.
4. Special Powers of the armed forces –
Any commissioned officer, warrant
officer, non-commissioned officer or
any other person of equivalent rank
in the armed forces may, in a
disturbed area,-
a) if he is of opinion that it is
necessary so to do for the
maintenance of public order, after
giving such due warning as he
may consider necessary, fire upon
or otherwise use force, even to the
causing of death, against any
person who is acting in
contravention of any law or order
for the time being in force in the
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wrongfully restrained or confined
or any property reasonably
suspected to be stolen property or
any arms, ammunition or
explosive substances believed to
be unlawfully kept in such
premises, and may for that
purpose use such force as may be
necessary.
i) Conferment of power on non-
commissioned officers like a
Havaldar cannot be said to be
bad and unjustified : Inderjit
Barua v .State of Assam, AIR,
1983 Del 514.
ii) The armed forces must act in
cooperation with the district
administration and not as an
Independent body. Armed
Forces could work in harmony
when they deployed in
disturbed area: Luithukia
v.Rishang Keishing, (1988) 2
Gau LR 159.
5. Arrested persons to be made over to
the police –Any person arrested and
taken into custody under this Act shall
be made over to the officer in charge
of the nearest police station with the
least possible delay, together with a
report of the circumstances
occasioning the arrest.
In case of arrest of any person,
army authority is duty bound to
handover to the officer-in-charge of the
nearest police station with least
possible delay: Horendi Gogoi
v. Union of India, (1991) Gau CR
3081.
6. Protection to persons acting under
Act – No prosecution, suit or other
legal proceeding shall be instituted,
except with the previous sanction of
the Central Government, against
any person in respect of anything
done or purported to be done in
exercise of the powers conferred by
this Act.
7. Repeal and Saving - [Repealed by
Amending and Repealing Act, 1960
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